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Young children, in general, appear to have a strong drive to explore the environment in ways
that reveal its underlying causal structure. But are they really attuned specifically to casual
information in this quest for understanding, or do they show equal interest in other types of
non-obvious information about the world? To answer this question, we introduced 20 three-
year-old children to two puppets who were anxious to tell the child about a set of novel
artifacts and animals. One puppet consistently described causal properties of the items
while the other puppet consistently described carefully matched non-causal properties
of the same items. After a familiarization period in which children learned which type of
information to expect from each informant, children were given the opportunity to choose
which they wanted to hear describe each of eight pictured test items. On average, children
chose to hear from the informant that provided causal descriptions on 72% of the trials.
This preference for causal information has important implications for explaining the role of
conceptual information in supporting early learning and may suggest means for maximizing
interest and motivation in young children.
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INTRODUCTION
Causal information appears to have special status in the minds
of young children. Even infants have a sophisticated sensitivity
to the causal structure of their world (e.g., Oakes and Cohen,
1994; Gopnik et al., 2001; Legare et al., 2010; Mascalzoni et al.,
2013). Importantly, this sensitivity appears to support early cat-
egorization, word learning, and memory more generally speak-
ing (e.g., Bauer and Mandler, 1989; Booth and Waxman, 2002;
Booth, 2008, 2009). For example, 3-year-olds are more likely to
remember novel labels if their novel animal or artifact referents
are described in terms of their causal properties than if they are
described in terms of their causally-irrelevant properties (Booth,
2009, 2014; also see Kemler Nelson et al., 2008). But why does
causal information have this facilitative effect on learning? One
possibility explored in the current work is that causal information
taps into children’s natural drive to learn about how and why
things behave and interact as they do.
Although the notion of children as little scientists questing
for knowledge originated in Piagetian theory (e.g., Piaget, 1952),
contemporary researchers have advanced similar ideas. Gopnik
(1998, 2000) has gone as far as to suggest that positive physiologi-
cal sensations propel children to acquire causal knowledge, just as
orgasm propels adults to reproduce (see Biederman and Vessel,
2006 for relevant physiological evidence). The intrinsic value
conferred upon causal information by such a mechanism, would
likely lead children to privilege causal over non-causal inputs.
The resulting heightened attention to causal information might
further enhance information processing and memory, thereby
facilitating learning (e.g., Craik et al., 1996). In the current work,
we take a first step toward testing this possibility. We reasoned that
if causal information facilitates learning because of its intrinsic
interest, then we should be able to observe that interest in chil-
dren’s preferences.
Ample research already reveals that young children are sensi-
tive to causal information, and that they seek out causal expla-
nations when they are not immediately obvious (e.g., Gopnik
and Sobel, 2000; Schulz and Bonawitz, 2007; Asher and Kemler
Nelson, 2008; Legare et al., 2010). For example, when given the
opportunity to inquire freely about novel objects, preschool-
ers most often want to know about causally-relevant properties
(Kemler Nelson et al., 2004; Greif et al., 2006). Related research
also indicates that young children tend to choose explanations
involving function (a notably rich causal construct) when asked
what they believe objects and their physical parts are “for” (Keil,
1992; Kelemen, 1999). None of this work, however, has explic-
itly contrasted children’s interests in learning causal vs. non-
causal information. In order to provide a direct test of children’s
predilection for causal information, we assessed preschoolers’
preferences for hearing from an informant that always provided
causal descriptions of novel artifacts and animals versus an infor-
mant that always provided equally plausible and distinctive, but
non-causal, descriptions of the same items. We reasoned that,
if learning causal information is especially valued (e.g., Gopnik,




Because we were interested in why causal information might
facilitate learning, we focused on 3-year-olds, an age at which
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this facilitative effect has been robustly observed (e.g., Kemler
Nelson et al., 2008; Booth, 2009, 2014). Twenty participants
(13 females) were recruited from either a database of Chicago
area families or a middle income preschool. Although most par-
ents identified their children as Caucasian, children of African-
American (20%), Hispanic (20%), and Asian (5%) descent also
participated. Participants (1) fell within an age range of 3;0–3;11
years (M = 42.2 mos.; SD = 3.89), (2) demonstrated a receptive
vocabulary score within one standard deviation of that expected
for their chronological age (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-
4 (PPVT-4), Form A (Dunn and Dunn, 2007) scores averaged
M = 101.16, SD = 9.33), (3) had less than 50% daily exposure
to a language other than English, and (4) had no parent-reported
history of developmental delay or disorder. This research was
conducted according to all ethical guidelines provided by the
American Psychological Association and with the approval of the
institutional review board at Northwestern University.
MATERIALS
Images
Pictures of ten novel items were generated using Spore® software
(see Figure 1). Novel stimuli (rather than existing, real-world
items) were used to ensure that familiarity did not influence
performance. To provide a broad representation of novel items,
and following on prior research examining the facilitative effect
of causal information on learning (e.g., Booth, 2009), half of the
stimuli were animals and half were artifacts. Each picture was
approximately 2 × 3-inches in dimension and was presented in
isolation on its own 3× 5-inch flashcard.
Descriptions
Two brief descriptions of non-obvious properties of each pictured
item were developed similar to those used in Booth (2009). One
description highlighted a causally-relevant property that reflected
how the object (or a part thereof) is used to achieve the goals of a
human or non-human agent (See Figure 1). The other description
also highlighted a non-obvious property, but did not provide any
hints regarding function. Although it could be argued that these
latter descriptions were not truly devoid of causal information in
that some might invite relevant inferences, they were relatively
impoverished in this respect, focusing instead on perceptual or
other properties that did not provide any conceptual insight.
Note that to the extent that these descriptions did embody causal
information, or support inferences thereof, they would weaken
the strength of our manipulation and would therefore work
against our hypothesis.
FIGURE 1 | Visual stimuli with descriptions of their causal and
non-causal properties are depicted in the order in which they were
presented to children. Those stimuli depicted in the first column were
presented during the familiarization phase. Those depicted in the remaining
four columns were presented on trials one through eight of the
description-preference phase.
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Causal and non-causal descriptions were matched as closely as
possible in terms of length, composition, plausibility and distinc-
tiveness. Specifically, descriptions were matched on total number
of words (Mcausal = 12.6 vs. Mnon−causal = 12.1) and syllables
(Mcausal = 14.9 vs. Mnon−causal = 14.6), as well as the number
of nouns, adjectives, and verbs they included. Furthermore, 12
undergraduates were asked to (1) rate each description in terms
of its plausibility with respect to its associated novel item and
(2) list all real-world items that they could think of that fit each
description. Conditions were equivalent in terms of both plau-
sibility (Mcausal = 3.6 vs. Mnon−causal = 3.6) and distinctiveness
(Mcausal = 1.41 vs. Mnon−causal = 1.34).
In some respects it would have been ideal to match the
descriptions even further in terms of the specific content words
included therein. For example, the causal description, “This has
two special parts near its mouth that help it find food to eat
in the dark” might be matched with the non-causal description,
“This can find things to eat in the dark and it has two special
things near its mouth.” Although, whenever possible, we used the
same content words across causal and non-causal descriptions, a
fuller implementation of this type of precise matching was prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the and conjunction is generally
less constraining on the distinctiveness of the descriptions than
is a causal bridge, thus forcing a mismatch on another important
control dimension. Second, we felt that linking the two elements
of each descriptor with the and conjunction might well facilitate
children’s spontaneous inference of a causal link between those
elements. Because minimizing the causal composition of the non-
causal descriptions was critical to our design, we felt that this
strategy was therefore untenable for the current investigation.
We do not believe that this unduly weakens the strength of our
manipulation because there is no obvious systematic reason why
the mismatched content words used in one condition would
be more attractive than those used in the other. Moreover, and
of critical importance, children made their selections on each
trial prior to hearing each pair of descriptions. Thus, selections
were necessarily based on which speaker reliably provided which
type of information, rather than on a direct comparison of the
descriptions provided on each trial.
Puppet informants
Two dog puppets, wearing different colored accessories, served
as informants. Nearly identical puppets were used to minimize
the likelihood that children’s choices would be influenced by
their opinion of the individual informants. Which informant was
assigned to provide the causal descriptions was counterbalanced
across subjects.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted during a single session either at
the Early Learning Laboratory at Northwestern University or at
the participant’s Chicago area preschool. Participants sat opposite
the experimenter at a small table. Sessions were recorded via a
Panasonic SDR-S26 camera placed approximately six feet across
from the participant. Each participant completed a familiariza-
tion phase, a description-preference test phase and an informant-
preference post-test phase.
Familiarization phase
The experimenter began by telling the child that they were going
to play a game in which two puppets would tell them different
kinds of things about a picture. The experimenter asked the
participant to listen closely. For each of two familiarization trials,
the experimenter first placed a picture of a novel artifact or animal
on the table. She then provided both the causal and non-causal
descriptions thereof, one via each puppet informant. Which
description type was provided first was counterbalanced across
familiarization trials and participants. Additionally, the location
of the causal and non-causal informants was counterbalanced
across participants. Children had approximately 15 s to visually
inspect each picture. At the end of the familiarization phase, the
experimenter reminded the participant that each puppet provided
different types of information, and told them that they would now
be allowed to choose which one they wanted to tell them about
each picture.
Description-preference test phase
For each of the eight trials, the experimenter showed the partic-
ipant a picture of a novel item and provided either the causal or
non-causal description according to the child’s choice of infor-
mant. In order to minimize the likelihood that children would
make choices based on novelty relative to the preceding trial(s),
the experimenter then provided the non-preferred description of
the item via the unselected informant.
Informant-preference post-test phase
As a check on the possibility that children’s choices might be
determined by preferences for a particular informant (irrespective
of the type of information they provided), the experimenter asked
the participants which puppet they preferred at the conclusion of
the experiment. Importantly, no new picture was provided at this
time, making it clear to children that they should not expect any
new information based on their selection.
RESULTS
Our primary dependent variable of interest was the proportion
of trials (out of eight) on which participants chose to hear from
the informant that always provided causal descriptions. Partici-
pants chose the causal informant on an average of 72% of trials
(SD = 0.21), a level of preference that differed significantly from
chance, t(19) = 15.33, p < 0.001, d = 7.03. Individual difference
analyses mirrored this finding, with 15 children preferring to hear
from the causal informant first on the majority of trials in contrast
to only two preferring to hear from the non-causal informant first
on the majority of trials, Yates’ χ2 (1, N = 17) = 4.17, p = 0.04.
The remaining three children chose the causal and non-causal
informants an equal number of times. On a trial by trial basis,
the proportion of children selecting the causal informant ranged
from 0.5 to 0.9, with no significant changes observed across any
two consecutive trials, except from trial 5 (0.85) to trial 6 (0.5),
McNemar’s χ2 (1, N = 20)= 4.00, p= 0.05.
Importantly, test trial choices did not appear to stem from a
preference for one informant over the other (irrespective of the
type of descriptions they provided). When simply asked which
informant they liked best (in the absence of a novel picture and
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imminent description thereof), just over half of the children
(n = 12) preferred the causal informant, and three of these
were children who had actually shown a preference for the non-
causal informant during the preceding test trials. The remaining
children preferred the non-causal informant (n = 6) or indicated
no preference (n = 2) in the post-test. Further reflecting the lack
of correspondence between preferences for description-type and
informant is the fact that children requested causal information
with equal frequency during description-type testing regardless
of which informant they chose during the post-test (M = 5.75,
SD= 2.0 vs. M = 5.63, SD= 1.33).
Although not central to our predictions, we also examined
the data for potential effects of stimulus domain. A paired t-
test comparing preferences on artifact versus animate kind trials
revealed no domain differences (Manimate = 0.76, SD = 0.27;
Martifact = 0.71, SD= 0.25), t(19)= 0.64, p= 0.53.
DISCUSSION
In sum, when given the choice between hearing causal versus non-
causal descriptions of novel artifacts and animals, preschoolers
preferred the former. Importantly, this preference was not driven
by which informant children liked best. These results demonstrate
that children distinguish between different types of descriptive
information about unfamiliar objects and animals, and show a
clear preference for causally-relevant information from an early
age. This conclusion is consistent with the theoretical position
that children are highly motivated to learn about the causal
structure of their world (Piaget, 1952; Gopnik, 1998). The current
findings are also consistent with empirical work indicating that
infants and young children actively seek out and use information
regarding novel causal properties (e.g., Gopnik and Sobel, 2000;
Booth, 2009; Schulz and Bonawitz, 2007; Legare et al., 2010).
Although children’s particular interest in causality is strongly
implied by this literature, the current study is the first to provide
a direct test of children’s preferences by pitting causal information
against carefully matched alternatives.
One might argue that the current results could be alternatively
interpreted in terms of children’s well-established preferences for
knowledgeable speakers (e.g., Koenig et al., 2004; Corriveau and
Harris, 2009). That is, although the procedure offered no explicit
reason for children to suspect the informants to have different
levels of knowledge, children might have perceived the causal
informant as more knowledgeable based solely on the type of
information it provided. Indeed, Sobel and Corriveau (2010)
report that 4-year-olds are more likely to endorse labels for novel
objects from speakers who previously demonstrated more causal
knowledge about those objects. Importantly, however, 4-year-
old participants (equivalent in age to those tested here) did not
respond systematically in Sobel and Corriveau’s task. Thus, it
seems more likely that participants in the current study based
their selections on the type of information that they expected to
receive rather than on the perceived reliability or trustworthiness
of the individual informants.
One might also question whether some unintentional dif-
ference between the causal and non-causal descriptions might
account for children’s preferences. For example, while well
matched in terms of length and content, descriptions were not
explicitly matched across conditions in terms of the degree
to which they detailed the dynamic activity of their referent.
Although this dimension is difficult to quantify, it is clear that
while all of the causal descriptions included a dynamic com-
ponent, only some of the non-causal descriptions did. Indeed,
two non-causal descriptions were particularly devoid of dynamic
activity (“This always has mushy food inside” and “This is always
filled with snow”). Children did not, however, select the causal
informant at unusually high rates on the trials immediately
following presentation of these static non-causal descriptions.
The proportion of children selecting the causal informant was
0.70 for both of these trials, a value that fell precisely at the
median across all trials. That said, further investigation will be
required to definitively determine whether the dynamic quality of
causal descriptions contributes to their being preferred by young
children.
Importantly, not only are the current results revealing about
children’s preferences, but they also offer potential insight into
why causal information facilitates learning in young children. For
example, they suggest that 3-year-olds might better remember
novel words when provided with causal rather than non-causal
descriptions of their referents because the causal descriptions are
particularly interesting. In this way, causal information might
harness children’s attention during the learning task, thereby
facilitating information processing. The current investigation of
course did not directly measure the effects of causal information
on attention, leaving underspecified an important link in the
logic undergirding this proposed mechanism (Booth, 2009, 2014).
Given that prior studies have not reported differences in outward
signs of attention in experimental conditions that include causal
information (e.g., Booth, 2009), it is likely that more sensitive
measures like heart-rate will be required to illustrate (or refute)
this link.
Additional inquiry will also be required to further specify
the generalizability of the results reported here. For example, it
remains to be specified when causal information comes to be pre-
ferred by children. Is it a biologically determined predisposition,
or is it something that is shaped by experience, only emerging
in the preschool years? Recent research suggests that preferences
for physically causal events are present even in newborn infants
(Mascalzoni et al., 2013). However, that work focuses on a very
different form of causal information than that investigated here.
Indeed there are numerous ways in which causal information
might be instantiated, and moving forward, it will be crucial to
consider these multiple forms developmentally, as well as across
different contexts (e.g., physical object exploration, book reading,
group play in preschools).
In closing, it is worth noting that the current findings also
have potentially important practical implications. Specifically,
highlighting the causal relevance of information might enhance
learning in early childhood education settings. Evidence sug-
gests that causal information itself is not only learned more
effectively by children than non-causal information, but that
other perceptual and linguistic information presented along with
causal information may also benefit by virtue of the advantageous
mental state it induces (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Booth, 2014).
Thus, integrating causal information into otherwise less engaging
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learning tasks has the potential to have a significant impact.
Forging bridges between basic research like that reported here,
and educational practice will therefore be an important priority as
we advance our understanding of the role that causal information
plays in supporting cognitive development.
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